Electronic Voting

Sunday, 7 December 2003

When electronic voting was proposed in the aftermath of the 2000 Florida debacle, it seemed like a good idea. No more hanging chads, dimpled chads, or swinging chads. Electronic voting with touch-screen computers offered a surefire solution to the problems experienced in Florida. Now, however, electronic voting has itself become a cause for serious concern.

It started when Walden O'Dell, CEO of Diebold and a staunch Bush supporter, promised to deliver the state of Ohio to the Republicans in the 2004 election. The problem is that Diebold manufactures touch-screen computers that are used to count votes. Suddenly O'Dell's boast sounded sinister. I think it was just an idle boast, made without considering the consequences, but sinister or not, it raised the question of whether computerized votes could be tampered with.

The answer is yes, it is possible to tamper with votes on a computer. Any third-rate hacker knows that. How could it be done? First, the software could be written in such a way as to miscount the actual votes, either by entering pre-determined results or by programming the computer to count every tenth vote for candidate A as a vote for candidate B. Second, the vote totals could be altered when they were being transferred from individual computers in a precinct to the master precinct computer, either by a program existing on the master computer or by a hacker who intercepts the transfer, probably by using a packet sniffer, and changes the numbers. Third, the numbers could be altered when they were transferred from the individual precincts to the state's (or county's, etc.) central computer, by the same means as described above. Fourth, a hacker could hack into any computer used in the voting process that was connected to the Internet and alter the results while they sat in a database. Fifth, election officials or others with access to the computers could log into the computers directly and change the results.

In addition to malicious, intentional tampering, there is also the possibility that the vote total could be changed by accident, by faulty software. If it seems unlikely that such a simple process as tallying votes could be misprogrammed, read on.

Some people have suggested that votes have already been tampered with, either intentionally or accidentally. The 2002 Georgia elections used touch-screen computers, and the results of several races shocked pollsters. The incumbent governor and U.S. senator were thrown out of office, and the state legislature became controlled by Republicans for the first time since Reconstruction. While it is possible that the results were valid--after all, most other Southern states have long since elected Republicans to such offices--the fact that the results were contrary to what pollsters expected, in some cases by margins of ten or fifteen percent, has raised some eyebrows. Odd results in certain areas of Virginia, Indiana, and California suggest accidental errors caused by programming errors. Examples include having more voters vote in a county than were registered, recording 100% voter turnout in several large counties, or subtracting one in every hundred votes. It's quite possible then, even probable, that many votes already cast by voters using touch-screen computers have not been counted properly.

Touch screen computers do offer real advantages to voters and election officials, but only if certain measures are taken.

First, the source code of the computer programs used to tally votes and transfer them to other computers must be publicly available for anyone who wants to scrutinize it. Without complete transparency, voters won't trust the system, and they shouldn't. Unbelievably, makers of the touch-screen computers have so far resisted making their software available for public viewing, insisting that it is proprietary. State governments should tell the companies that they can either make the software publicly accessible or sell their machines to other countries (if they can find any gullible enough to buy them). No part of any government election in the U.S. is private, other than the privacy accorded to voters, who cast their ballots in secret. Companies that insist on keeping their software secret should be sent packing.
Second, every computer should give the voter who uses it a paper receipt. The voter should be able to check the receipt before leaving the terminal area, and if she finds an error--whether of the computer or the human variety--she should be able to have an election official correct it.
Third, every computer should generate a receipt for election workers that can be used to check the results of voting in the case of a recount.
Fourth, the touch-screen terminals used in elections should be thoroughly tested, by someone other than the manufacturer, prior to elections.
Fifth, paper ballots should be available in every precinct for voters who prefer not to use the computer terminals. These paper ballots can also be used in the event of computer malfunctions.

There is a real danger that U.S. elections can be hijacked by unscrupulous corporations, politicians, or hackers. I will go even further and say that, if it hasn't already happened, some future election will be hijacked, votes will be altered, and American democracy will cease to function, unless important steps are taken to ensure that electronic voting is properly regulated, not by corporations, but by the U.S. government.

Progressive Theology